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Deputy US secretary of state John Negroponte was in Central America June 3-6 mainly to sell
the isthmus on Plan Merida. Also called the Merida Initiative, the US says in a press release the
program "aims to help Mexico and Central America combat narcotrafficking, transnational youth
crime, and terrorism." The same release quoted Negroponte as saying that the US is backing
regional leaders who are "confronting gangs, organized crime, and drug lords." It now appears that
the trip was successful.
Plan Merida would provide US$100 million for Central America, an amount dwarfed by the US
$450 million intended for Mexico, but apparently enough to get the endorsement of isthmus
governments. Those amounts were just by way of down payment. Over three years, the US has said
it would pour US$1.4 billion into its drug, gang, and terrorism wars in Mexico alone and "a smaller,
unspecified amount for Central America."
To help sell the deal, Thomas Shannon, assistant secretary of state for Western Hemisphere affairs,
who accompanied Negroponte, informed local reporters in Guatemala that they are between
Colombia and Mexico and therefore have a "special vulnerability to criminals and narcotraffickers."
Despite having spent a great deal of money for a very long time on these issues, Shannon conceded
elsewhere in congressional testimony on May 8 that drug trafficking and organized crime have
grown during the last decade. He said that leaders and the public in El Salvador, Honduras, and
Guatemala regard this situation as a "national emergency requiring an urgent response."
Prior to the push on the Merida Initiative, in April, the State Department put out a fact sheet
summing the statistics, part of the gist of which is that 70% of the drugs reaching the US pass
through Central America. Therefore, said the document, "It is in the national security interest
of the United States to support our partners' fight" against criminal groups. Each country's role
in the problem Plan Merida's inclusion of Central America leans heavily for justification on the
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR). In its country-by-country analysis the 2007
edition of the report found:
Belize: Involved in transshipment of drugs to the US. It features borders with Guatemala and
Mexico, navigable inland waterways, jungles, unprotected coastline, and hundreds of small islands
(keys). Government is corrupt, and the legal system is weak. Money laundering flourishes.
Costa Rica: It is increasingly important as a transit point, geographically well positioned for
transshipment of heroin and cocaine to both US and Europe. Transnational gangs involved in street
level sales.
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El Salvador: transit country to Mexico for drugs from South America by both land and sea.
Guatemala: Major transshipment point with added local poppy cultivation increasing recently and
estimated at around 600-800 ha. Government, military, and police all involved in corruption, unable
to control drugs traffic, and weak institutions. Recent improvements still "not satisfactory."
Honduras: Increasing traffic being shifted from Guatemala. Sparse populations, isolated jungle
regions, limited resources, corruption, poor border control all factors.
Nicaragua: Included in the transshipment corridor. Corrupt judicial system hampers control efforts.
Panama: Ideal geographic location and highly developed maritime infrastructure for transshipment
to US and Europe. Government is cooperative with US but less so with regional neighbors.
Intimating that up to now spending on the drug war has been skimpy, Ray Walser, senior policy
analyst for Latin America at the Heritage Foundation in Washington, was quoted in the State
Department's releases as calling the Merida Initiative the US's "first big effort to deal with these
problems." Until now, said the analyst for the conservative think tank, Congress had only passed
"piecemeal legislation," creating small programs. But now, efforts will be scaled up to dealing with
the problems regionally through the Secretaria del Sistema de la Integracion Centroamericana
(SICA).
The initiative will spend more money on the war against gangs "than we have before," but amounts
for this and the other items remain uncertain because House and Senate bills differ and have not
yet been reconciled. Also, Haiti and the Dominican Republic may be added to the list of participant
countries. Because of the uncertainty about the budget, Negroponte was unable to give officials in
Guatemala an exact quote, but in a meeting with President Alvaro Colom, Vice President Rafael
Espada, Government Minister Vinicio Gomez, and Attorney General Juan Luis Florido, he said
Guatemala would be a major beneficiary. It was reported that Foreign Minister Harold Rodas had
said earlier Guatemala would get 45% of the total amount destined for Central America and the two
potential add-on states. He said this was because his country occupies the end of the isthmus most
proximal to the US. Just what is to be done with the funding is still sketchy.
The intelligence chief of the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) told a Senate hearing that
there would not be any increase in agents in the region. He did not specify how many agents ply
Central America, but there are plenty. "In Mexico," he said, "the DEA works with a Special Unit
of Investigation of 227 agents. There is another group in Guatemala investigating the rest of the
countries of Central America, except Costa Rica." He said what was needed was funding for better
air support, surveillance, and information systems.
Past humiliations remembered
After experiencing a lot of pushback in Mexico on the terms of the initiative (see SourceMex,
2008-06-11), Negroponte was careful in his public statements to stress that the plan would avoid
interference and sovereignty issues. He said, "This is a plan developed with the affected countries,
Mexico and Central America. We want it to be based on collaboration; it is not something we want
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to impose." Still, some aspects of the collaboration seem to be a step backward to the time when
the US was in a stronger position in Latin America and employed the "certification" mechanism
of determining who its friends were in the drug war. Most of the region found the annual ritual
of certification humiliating, but now the report-card era is returning under a different guise in
Guatemala.
Negroponte said the US would start training the Guatemalan military again but only after certifying
that they have cooperated with investigations of officers accused of human rights violations. There
was a reported US$500,000 involved in this. Guatemala's history might well deserve this kind of
vigilance, but sovereignty is sovereignty, and this is precisely the kind of imposition Mexico objected
to in its negotiations with the US on the implementation of Plan Merida on that side of the border.
Even with the more docile attitude taken in Central America toward the northern benefactor,
there was plenty of criticism of the Merida Initiative. Security analyst Mario Merida did not have a
problem with the terms, but he said Guatemala ought to get more money. "If Mexico gets US$300
million, Guatemala ought to get US$200 million," he calculated.
Carmen Rosa de Leon of the Instituto de Ensenanza para el Desarrollo Sostenible (IEPEDES)
objected that the plan prioritizes US interests, not those of Guatemala. "You don't see integrated
support to the police. The narcotraffic unit is strengthened, but the crimes that are the product of
narcotraffic and that affect Guatemalans are not mentioned." Guatemala's narcotics police have a
long and deep history of corruption, but official Guatemala still wants to see their minions bolstered,
and they see Plan Merida as the way to do it.
On the border with Mexico, the unit will get reinforcement from the military. "The unit will be
ready within 90 days and will conduct operations as needed in the border zone. It is going to have
around 500 people," Government Ministry spokesman Ricardo Gatica told reporters. "The border
with Mexico is very porous and that is where all the efforts of this elite corps will concentrate,
without ignoring other areas." This operation also has the air of a step backward about it in that it
perpetuates the practice of assigning an internal-security role to the armed forces. Citizen sensitivity
to the Army's turning against its own people has hardly had time to diminish since the end of the
internal war in 1996. It does not go unnoticed that the US played a supportive role then, just as it
does now. Besides the Army, the border drug force will also integrate agents of the Presidential
Guard and the Secretaria de Analisis e Informacion Antinarcoticos (SAIA). Gatica made the
announcement and was confident of the time line in anticipation of the US Congress approval of the
funding.
Compared with Plan Merida negotiations in Mexico, Negroponte appears to have had an easy
time of it on the isthmus. El Salvador, for example, has been more than pleased to cooperate with
the foreign outreach of US President George W. Bush's administration. The assistant secretary
mentioned the support of President Antonio Saca's administration for the Iraq war, where
Salvadoran soldiers, 280 of them, still serve (see NotiCen, 2007-02-01 and 2008-02-14). He noted
as well that El Salvador has opened Comalapa International Airport to US surveillance activities
and intimated that the quid pro quo, Temporary Protection Status (TPS) extension for Salvadorans
working in the US and boosting the economy with remittances, would be looked upon with
sympathy. More than cooperative, El Salvador is eager to participate.
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Coming elections in both countries portend far less interest in initiatives of this kind. Polls show
Democrats somewhat likely to take the presidency from the Republicans in November and the
FMLN very likely to take the office from the Alianza Republicana Nacionalista (ARENA) next March
(see NotiCen, 2008-06-12). It was a bit tougher sledding for Negroponte in Honduras, where, as US
ambassador when that country was fighting its proxy war against the Sandinistas in Nicaragua,
Negroponte oversaw the militarization of Honduras in support of the contras and the buildup
for a US attack on Nicaragua. Seen as a human rights violator himself, Negroponte's welcome in
Honduras was punctuated with protest.
Among the reasons Honduras has to cooperate with the US on Plan Merida is the Palmerola airport,
an important asset with the closure of Toncontin to large international traffic following a May
30 crash (see NotiCen, 2008-06-12). It was reported that the secretary discussed Palmerola with
President Manuel Zelaya. The US will contribute US$87.9 million to build the highway between
Comayagua and Tegucigalpa, linking the airport with the capital.
-- End --
